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Wells: Wells: Beyond Campaign Finance:

Beyond Campaign Finance:
The First Amendment Implications of
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC'
ChristinaE. Wells*

In Buckley v. Valeo2 the United States Supreme Court decided the
constitutionality of Congress's attempt to place limitations on political
expenditures and contributions during federal election campaigns. While the
Court acknowledged that the contribution and expenditure provisions "operate[d]
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities" requiring the
closest of judicial scrutiny,3 it ultimately came to different conclusions regarding
the limitations. Specifically, the Court upheld the contribution provisions,
arguing that they imposed only a marginal restriction upon the contributors' free
speech and associational rights and that they were justified by the government's
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.4 In contrast,
the Court struck down the expenditure provisions, finding them to be far more
burdensome than contribution limitations and unjustified in light of the
government's concerns about corruptions
Few people have been happy with the Court's approach. Scholars have
especially criticized Buckley, generating an extensive body of literature along the
way. 6 Much of this criticism focuses on three specific aspects of Buckley: (1)
its willingness to treat monetary expenditures as protected expression,7 (2) its
determination that contribution and expenditure limits have different

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. Aaron Bryant and
Tammy Eigenheer provided valuable research assistance on this Essay. Special thanks
also go to Bill Fisch for his valuable insights and comments on this Essay. Although my
involvement in Shrink was minimal, in the interest of disclosure I want to acknowledge
that I provided some assistance to the Missouri Attorney General's Office in preparation
for oral argument before the United States Supreme Court.
1. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
2. 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
3. Id. at 14-16.
4. Id. at 23-29.
5. Id. at 49-52.
6. See C. Edwin Baker, CampaignExpenditures and FreeSpeech, 33 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 1, 1 (1998) (noting that criticism of Buckley "was intense and has only
mounted over time"); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
GovernmentalMotive in FirstAmendment Doctrine,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 415,467 (1996)

(noting that Buckley is "one of the most castigated [decisions] in modem First
Amendment case law").
7. See, e.g., Burt Neubome, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a
Question, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 789, 796 (1998); J. Skelly Wlright, Politics and the
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005 (1976).
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constitutional status,8 and (3) its refusal to consider other government interests
supporting regulation, such as the need to equalize influence on the outcome of
elections. 9 Nevertheless, later Courts have adhered to Buckley's reasoning." In
its most recent pronouncement on the topic, Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
GovernmentPAC," the Court largely reaffirmed Buckley's basic principles and
found that the strict contribution limits in Missouri's campaign finance law did
not violate the First Amendment.
In light of the "mainstream orthodoxy" favoring limitations on political
money, 2 Shrink is likely to fuel both states' attempts to reform campaign
spending 3 and yet another round of scholarly arguments regarding the wisdom
of Buckley. This Essay, however, is less concerned with the campaign finance 4
aspects of Shrink than with the decision's broader implications. In the course of

8. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Money andPolitics: A Perspective on the First
Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1054 (1985);
Neuborne, supra note 7, at 796; Kathleen Sullivan, PoliticalMoney and Freedom of
Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 663, 666 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, PoliticalEqualityand
Unintended Consequences, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 1390, 1395 (1994).
9. See, e.g., Neubome, supranote 7, at 797; Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1400; J.
Skelly Wright, Money andthe PollutionofPolitics: Is the FirstAmendment an Obstacle

to PoliticalEquality, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 636-37 (1982).
10. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996);
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985);
FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982); Citizens Against Rent
Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Cal. Med.
Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978).
11. 528 U.S. 377, 381-82 (2000).
12. See Sullivan, supranote 8, at 664.
13. As of 1993, thirty-two states had enacted contribution limitations. See William
J. Connolly, Note, How Low Can You Go? State Campaign ContributionLimits and the
FirstAmendment, 76 B.U. L. REV. 483, 497-98 (1996). A number of municipalities have
also enacted contribution limitations. See Curtis K. Tao, Note, A Compelling
Opportunityto Rethink the FlawedEvolution of Contribution Speech, 51 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1345, 1349 (1999). Unlike Missouri, most contribution limitations are equal to or
exceed Buckley's $1000 limit. See Connolly, supra, at 498. Shrink's willingness to
uphold the stricter Missouri limits may spur states to follow Missouri's lead and enact
lower contribution limits.
14. By using the term "campaign finance aspects," I refer to the typical scholarly
focus on Buckley as described in Part I.A. See also Baker, supranote 6, at 1-2 (noting
the "standard form" of the usual criticism of Buckley); Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of
Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political,and ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 VA. L. REV.
1761, 1762 (1999) (linking criticisms of Buckley to academics' tendencies to "understand
their task to be that of developing the implications of normative democratic theory").
While the issue of campaign finance reform is a worthy one, I leave it to others to discuss
that topic-fully informed, I hope, by an understanding of Shrink's other flaws.
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its decision, the Shrink Court not only obfuscated the standard of scrutiny
applicable to contribution regulations, it effectively ignored the government's
lack of factual support for the law, instead accepting the state's assertions at
face-value. Consequently, Shrink is far more than a simple application of
Buckley. Rather, it reflects fundamental problems with the Court's standards of
review in First Amendment cases generally. The more global nature of Shrink's
problems suggest that, despite scholarly focus on the Buckley framework, more
than just campaign finance reform is at stake.
Part I of this Essay discusses legal background, focusing first on the Courts
decision in Buckley and then on the Shrink litigation. Part II itemizes Shrink's
flaws, ultimately concluding that those flaws cannot be attributed solely to
Buckley. Finally, Part III examines the Court's standards of scrutiny in First
Amendment cases and argues that Shrink results at least in part from flaws found
in those standards.
I. NIXON v. SHRINK MISSOUPJ GOVERNMENTPAC
A. Setting the Stage-Buckley v. Valeo
In 1974, in the wake of egregious campaign abuses by the Nixon
administration,' 5 Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act 6
("FECA"), its first comprehensive attempt to regulate election campaigns and the
money associated with them. 7 Among other things, FECA included regulations
limiting the amount of political expenditures and contributions related to specific
candidates during federal election campaigns.' s The statute prohibited
individuals from contributing $1000 to any single candidate during an election
campaign or from spending more than $1000 relative to a particular candidate. 9
Soon after its enactment, several political groups of varying interests challenged
its constitutionality, relying primarily on the argument that FECA's limitations
violated the First Amendment rights of free expression and association. '
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case after the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia upheld both the contribution and expenditure limitations
as limitations on expressive conduct rather than pure speech!2 ' The Court
15. See William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chancefor CampaignFinanceReform,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 335, 339 (2000) (discussing Nixon campaign abuses).
16. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
17. For a history of campaign-related regulations up to and including FECA, see
Justin A. Nelson, Note, The Supply and Demand of Campaign FinanceReform, 100
COLUM. L. RaV. 524, 532-39 (2000).
18. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1976).
19. Id. at 13.

20. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 346 (describing plaintiffs' interests and
alliances).
21. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd in part, 424

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 9

MISSOURILA WREVIEW

[Vol. 66

rejected the appellate court's findings, noting that regulations on contributions
and expenditures implicated core First Amendment rights related to political
expression.2 As such, the contribution and expenditure limitations were subject
to "exacting scrutiny" rather than the intermediate
scrutiny standard used to
3
judge regulations of expressive conduct.
Applying this standard, the Court in Buckley reached differing results
regarding the contribution and expenditure limitations. According to the Court,
expenditure limitations "necessarily reduce[] the quantity of expression
[because] communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure
of money."'24 Such significant restrictions could be justified only by a
"substantial government interest." The government proffered three interests to
support the regulation: (1) the prevention of corruption or appearance of
corruption, (2) the need to equalize citizens' ability to influence the outcome of
elections, and (3) the need to make the political system more open to candidates
by reigning in skyrocketing costs.26 The Court found the latter two justifications
to be antithetical to First Amendment principles.27 Although noting that
prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof might be a sufficient reason
to regulate speech in some circumstances, the Court found that interest
insufficient to justify expenditure limitations.28
In contrast, the Court upheld the contribution limitations. Although
recognizing that such limitations affected core political rights, the Court believed
them to place only a "marginal restriction" upon the contributor's ability to

U.S. 1 (1976). The District of Columbia Circuit applied the four-prong test announced
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Under that test, a regulation of
expressive conduct does not violate the First Amendment as long as it is within the power
ofthe government to regulate, furthers an important or substantial government interest,
that interest is unrelated to free expression, and the regulation is no broader than essential
to further the government interest. Id. at 377. Since O'Brien, the Court has made clear
that its test is the equivalent of the intermediate scrutiny test applied in other contexts.
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-98 (1989).
22. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.

23. Id. at 14-18.
24. Id. at 19; see also id. at 39 ("It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure
limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by individuals, groups, and
candidates.").
25. Id. at 47.

26. Id. at 25-26.
27. Id.at 26. In one of its most-quoted passages, the Court specifically noted that:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign
to the First Amendment ....

The First Amendment's protection against

governmental abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to
depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public discussion.
Id. at 48-49.
28. Id. at 45-48.
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communicate regarding, and associate with, political candidates." In addition,
the Buckley per curiam noted that even association rights could be overcome if
the contribution limits were "closely drawn" and justified by a "sufficiently
important interest" 30 Unlike expenditure limitations, the Court found that large
contributions posed a greater likelihood of the actual incidence or appearance of
a quidpro quo arrangement. 3' Thus, the government's interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption presented a "sufficiently important
interest" for regulating contributions.3 Furthermore, the Court found that the
contribution limitations were not so unreasonably low as to fail the "closely
tailored" requirement 33 Refusing to question the legislature's capping of
contributions at $1000, the Court noted that "'a court has no scalpel to probe,
whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.'i'M
B. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC
1. Background and Lower Court Decisions
In 1994, the Missouri legislature amended its campaign finance law,
restricting contributions that persons could make to candidates for political
office3 Specifically, the new law contained a sliding-scale of contribution
limitations ranging from $1075 to $275 depending on the office sought. The

29. Id at 20-22. The Court reasoned that:
A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or
campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced
by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom
to discuss candidates and issues....
[Furthermore the] contribution ceilings thus limit one important means
of associating with a candidate or a committee, but leave the contributor free
to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in
the association's efforts on behalf of candidates.
Id. at 21-22.
30. Id. at25.
31. Id. at 26-28.
32. Id. at 25.
33. Id. at29.
34. Id. at 30 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821,842 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
35. See generally Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734,736-37
(E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom. Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (describing amendments and their history).
36. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 130.032.1 (Supp. 1999). The original scale ranged from
$1000 to S250 but was adjusted for inflation as required by other statutory provisions.
See Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.032.2 (Supp. 1999). In 1998, the Missouri Ethics

Commission, the entity in charge of implementing the campaign finance laws, amended
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Shrink litigation arose when Zev David Fredman, a candidate for state auditor
in the Republican primary, was unable to accept contributions greater than $1075
from Shrink Missouri Government PAC ("Shrink PAC"), a political action
committee." Fredman and Shrink PAC filed suit in federal court claiming that
the statutory limitations violated their First Amendment rights of free speech and
association because the limits in current dollars were substantially below those
in Buckley. The defendants, various state officials, relied on Buckley's
appearance of corruption rationale and argued that the contribution limitations
were necessary to battle "the perception that the individuals or entities making
these contributions are attempting to curry favor with the state's elected
'
officials."38
The district court upheld the contribution limitations using a strict scrutiny
standard, which it believed was required by Buckley." According to the district
court, Missouri's interest in preventing the appearance of corruption was a "'real
harm"' even if no actual corruption was documented.' In support of the fact that
such a harm existed, the court relied on an affidavit by Senator Wayne Goode,
chair of the Missouri Senate Committee on Campaign Finance Reform, which
recounted the committee hearings regarding large contributions and which stated
his belief that such contributions "have the appearance of buying votes as well
as the potential to buy votes."'" Based upon Senator Goode's affidavit, certain
newspaper articles advocating campaign finance reform,42 and an earlier
statewide referendum attempting to pass contribution limitations ("Proposition
A"),43 the district court found that Missouri satisfied strict scrutiny's "compelling

the amounts in the statute to reflect inflation. Thus, the $1000 limit was raised to $1075.
See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 520 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'd sub nom.
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). The Shrink opinions typically
refer to the $1075 figure rather than the original amount.
37. As a candidate for state auditor, Fredman fell under the portion of the statute
limiting contributions to $1075 for candidates for governor, lieutenant governor,
secretary of state, state treasurer, state auditor, or attorney general. See Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 130.032.1(1) (Supp. 1999).
38. Shrink, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 738.
39. Id. at 737.
40. Id. at 738 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)).
41. Id.
42. The district court singled out three newspaper stories and editorials from the
same period that tend[ed] to support the senator's statements. Id. at 738 n.6.
43. In 1994, the Missouri legislative assembly passed Senate Bill 650, which
eventually became the law challenged in Shrink. Before that law could take effect, the
citizens of Missouri passed Proposition A, which placed significantly more restrictive
limits on campaign contributions than Senate Bill 650. Specifically, contributions were
limited to a sliding scale ranging from $100 to $300 depending on the political office
sought. The Missouri Attorney General determined that Proposition A superseded Senate
Bill 650 and that its provisions governed campaign contributions. Id. at 735-36. The
Eighth Circuit struck down the limits imposed by Proposition A, however, arguing that

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/9
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interest" requirement. It further found the contribution limitations to be
"narrowly tailored" because they were aimed at preventing the large donations
perceived to be the source of influence peddling while not being so low as to
prevent effective fund-raising."
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court. It too believed that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review under Buckley. s It also agreed
with the district court that the state's interest in preventing the appearance of
corruption was compelling in the abstract. It found, however, that the state's
evidence on this point was insufficient. According to the Eighth Circuit, "the
State... must prove that Missouri has a realproblem with corruption or a
perception thereof as a direct result of large campaign contributions." The
court noted that the state's reliance on Senator Goode's affidavit was insufficient
to meet this burden because it contained nothing other than the Senator's "belief'
as to the appearance of corruption, which could not be extrapolated to the
general public.47 The court further ruled that the amount of the contribution
limitations violated Buckley. Although it acknowledged that Buckley did not set
a minimum threshold of acceptable contribution limits, the court noted that the
$1075 limitation in Missouri's law was substantially smaller in real dollars than
the $1000 limit approved in Buckley in 1976. Thus, the limits were "'too low
to allow meaningful participation in protected political speech and association,
and,.., not narrowly tailored to serve' the alleged interest."'"
2. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Shrink in order to determine
whether the Eighth Circuit's decision comported with Buckley. Ultimately, the
Court found that it did not. Initially, the Court discussed the appropriate
standard of review in such cases. It recognized that Buckley had eschewed

they were "dramatically lower" than those allowed in Buckley and inconsistent with the
First Amendment. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1995). After
invalidation of Proposition A, Senate Bill 650 became the controlling law in Missouri
regarding campaign contributions for state officers. See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v.
Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 161 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998), revd
sub nom. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
44. See Shrink,5 F. Supp. 2d at 740-42.
45. See Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 521 (8th Cir. 1998), rev'd
sub nom. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
46. Id.
at 522 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id at 522-23. The court relied on the plaintiffs' figures showing that S1075 in
1976 dollars equaled approximately S378 in current dollars. Id. at 523 nA.
49. Id. at 523 (quoting Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1366 (8th Cir. 1994)).
50. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,381-82 (2000).
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''
application of intermediate scrutiny in favor of a more "exacting scrutiny."
Nevertheless, the Shrink Court reasoned that "exacting scrutiny" meant different
things depending upon the context. Specifically, the Court argued that "'[w]e
have consistently held that restrictions on contributions require less compelling
justification than restrictions on independent spending.' It has.., been plain
ever since Buckley that contribution limits would more readily clear the hurdles
before them."5' Accordingly, the Court described the appropriate standard of
scrutiny in cases involving contribution limitations:

[U]nder Buckley's standard of scrutiny, a contribution limit involving
"significant interference" with association rights could survive if the
Government demonstrated that contribution regulation was "closely
drawn" to match a "sufficiently important interest," though the dollar
amount of the limit need not be "finely tun[ed]." 53
With the newly-clarified standard in hand, the Court turned to its
application in the context of the Missouri statute. First, the Court reiterated
Buckley's finding that the perception of corruption "'inherent in a regime of
large individual financial contributions"' was a sufficiently important interest to
justify the statute.- It also found the evidence adduced in support of the statute
(i.e., the Goode affidavit, newspaper articles, and Proposition A)55 adequate to
satisfy this standard of scrutiny. According to the Court, "[t]he quantum of
empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative
judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the
justification raised."'5 ( In this case, because the notion that large contributions
might cause corruption or a perception thereof was "neither novel nor
implausible," the evidence presented by the state was "more than sufficient. '7
The Court thus rejected Shrink PAC's claim that cases since Buckley had
supplemented
its evidentiary standard, requiring a more concrete showing of real
58
harm.
Finally, the Court found that Missouri's contribution limitations were
adequately tailored, noting that the $1075 limit bore a "striking resemblance" to
the $1000 limit in Buckley and was not fundamentally different from it in kind.59
Rejecting respondent's argument regarding the disparity in the value of $1000
51.
52.
(1986)).
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 386.
Id. at 387 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 259-60
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 30 (1976)).
Id. at 390.
Id. at 393-95.
Id. at 391.

57. Id.
58. Id. at 391-92.
59. Id. at 395.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol66/iss1/9
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in current and 1976 dollars, the Court found that the real issue was whether the
limits had a dramatic effect on a candidate's fund-raising abilities. ' The Shrink
Court specifically noted that since the statute's 1994 enactment, candidates were
able to amass "'funds sufficient to run effective campaigns,"' and that prior to
1994, most contributions for state political offices already fell below the limits
set forth in the Missouri statute. 61 Accordingly, the statute was "closely tailored"
to meet the state's interest in preventing the appearance of corruption while still
allowing effective campaign fund-raising.
II. SHRINK'S FLAWS
A. The StandardofReview
Shrink's flaws begin with its standard of review-or, more specifically,
with its waffling regarding the relevant standard of review. In reviewing
regulations of obviously high value speech, the Court currently uses one of two
standards of review: strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny. When applying the
former, and more stringent, standard of review, the Court asks whether the
regulation is "narrowly tailored or necessary" to meet a "compelling"
government interest.' When applying the latter, the Court asks whether the
regulation is "narrowly tailored" to serve a "legitimate" or "substantial" interest,
with an understanding that the regulation "need not be the least-restrictive or
least-intrusive means" of meeting those interests.'
In discussing the appropriate standard of scrutiny, Shrink acknowledged
Buckley's rejection of intermediate scrutiny and its use of "exacting scrutiny" to
examine contribution and expenditure limitations.' One might conclude from
this that Shrink meant to adopt the stricter of the two standards of scrutiny
discussed above. The Court has generally used the term "exacting scrutiny"
synonymously with "strict scrutiny"' and many scholarsS and lower courts67

60. Idat 396.
61. Id For example, the Court noted that over 97% of all contributions to state
auditor candidates were S2000 or less, and that less than 1.5% of contributions to
candidates for secretary of state exceeded S2000. Id. at 396 & n.9.
62. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377-78 (1992). For more on these
standards of scrutiny, see infra Part I.A.
63. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,799 (1989).
64. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000).
65. See, eg., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994) ("Our
precedents... apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress... speech
because of its content."); Id. at 677-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (noting that content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny).
66. See BeVier, supranote 14, at 1761; James Bopp, Jr., ConstitutionalLimitson
Campaign ContributionLimits, 11 REGENTS U. L. REv. 235, 241 (1999); David Cole,
Hanging With the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right ofAssociation,
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interpret Buckley as applying that standard. Moreover, Buckley's recognition
that campaign finance regulations affect core First Amendment values68 argues
in favor of applying strict scrutiny. But a sentence acknowledging that strict
scrutiny governs the issue in Shrink never materialized. Rather, the Shrink
majority segued immediately into an explanation of Buckley's distinction
between expenditure and contribution limitations and its willingness to uphold
the latter.69 In fact, the Shrink Court ultimately concluded that, under Buckley,
regulations of campaign contributions were constitutional if the government
proffered a "sufficiently important" government interest and a "closely drawn"
(although not "finely tuned") statute."
The Buckley standard as interpreted by Shrink sounds far more like
intermediate scrutiny than strict review. It is entirely possible that the Shrink
majority meant such an interpretation. At one point it characterized Buckley as
intimating that "different standards might govern expenditure and contribution
limits" and that "restrictions on contributions require less compelling
justification than restrictions on independent spending."' Yet even here the
Court sent mixed signals. Shrink never actually rejected the lower courts'
1999 SuP. CT. REv. 203, 245; Richard E. Levy, The ConstitutionalParameters of
CampaignFinanceReform, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 43, 44-48 (1999); Molly Peterson,
Note, Re-Examining CompellingInterests and RadicalState FinanceReforms: So Goes
the Nation?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 429-30 (1998); Mary Sherris, Note,

Colorado Republican Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission:

Maintaining What Remains of the Federal Election Campaign Act Through
ConstitutionalCompromise, 30 AKRON L. REV. 561, 564 (1997); Tao, supranote 13, at
1351-52. But see Marshall, supranote 15, at 351-52 (describing Buckley's standard as
"arguably less-than-strict-scrutiny"); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions,
54 U. CHI. L. Ray. 46, 62 (1987) (arguing that Buckley applied intermediate scrutiny to
contribution limitations).
67. In cases other than Shrink, the Eighth Circuit consistently has interpreted
Buckley as requiring strict scrutiny review for contribution limitations. See Russell v.
Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 567 (8th Cir. 1998); Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir.

1995); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1365 (8th Cir. 1994). Other jurisdictions operate
on a similar assumption. See, e.g., N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th
Cir. 1999); Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 1998); Ky. Right to Life,
Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1997); Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Buckley, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (D. Colo.
1999); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Barker
v. Wis. Ethics Bd., 815 F. Supp. 1216 (W.D. Wis. 1993); State v. Alaska Civil Liberties
Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999); Barnes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 87 (Ct. App. 1993); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. State, 408 So. 2d 211 (Fla.
1981); Winbome v. Easley, 523 S.E.2d 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Ethics Comm'n v.
Keating, 958 P.2d 1250 (Okla. 1998); Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44 (Vt. 1995).
68. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1976).
69. See Shrink, 528 U.S. at 386.
70. Id. at 387-88.
71. Id. at 387.
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application of strict scrutiny. In fact, it explicitly denied that it was in any way
"relaxing" Buckley's standard of review.' Moreover, in giving content to its
characterization of Buckley's standard, the Shrink majority dropped a footnote
to several freedom of association cases, all of which used the strict scrutiny
standard Shrink thus leaves us in a sort of purgatory, wondering which of the
existing standards it uses or, if it uses an altogether new standard, where such a
standard falls in the spectrum of review.74
One could argue that Shrink's lack of clarity is not new, but stems
essentially from Buckley. Buckley's willingness to uphold limits on
contributions after applying "exacting scrutiny," suggests that its application of
that standard is less rigorous than typically associated with strict scrutiny. s
Additionally, other than the phrase "exacting scrutiny," Buckley never used the
buzzwords commonly associated with strict scrutiny and instead used a variety
of terms to describe the standard of review. In referring to the government
interest necessary
to support the statute, for example, Bucley used the terms
"substantial, 76 "sufficiently important," and "weighty." ' Similarly, Buckley
tempered its requirement that a statute be "closely drawn!' with the observation
that contribution limits need not be surgically precise.' which suggests
something less than a strict scrutiny standard. Finally, the Court's decisions
since Buckley are not altogether clear regarding the standard of review applied

72. Id. at 389 n.4.
73. Id. at 388 n.3.
74. Not surprisingly, Shrink's dissenters took issue with the majority's cavalier
treatment of the standard of review. Justices Thomas and Scalia argued that the Shrink
Court's standard was "suigeneris." Id at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent also
deemed it to be "something less-much less-than strict scrutiny," which the dissent
noted Buckley at least purported to apply. Id. at 421. Justice Kennedy also bemoaned
the majority opinion, noting that "in defining the controlling standard of review and
applying it to the urgent claim presented, the Court seems almost indifferent." Id. at 405
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
75. See supranote 66.
76. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,47 (1976).
77. Id. at 25.
78. Id. at29.
79. Id.
at 25.
80. Id at 30. The difficulty in determining the standard of review is exacerbated
by the Buckley Court's tendency to sprinkle its discussion over numerous pages
regarding various aspects of contribution and expenditure limitations. Id. at 14-59.
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to contribution limits, with some apparently using strict scrutiny8 and others
intimating that a lower standard is appropriate.8 2
To be sure, Buckley is not a model of clarity. Nevertheless, Shrink does not
merely reflect Buckley's shortfalls. We can forgive Buckley for much of its
ambiguity because it came at a time when tiers of scrutiny in the First
Amendment were in their infancy, having only recently been imported into First
Amendment jurisprudence from Equal Protection jurisprudence.' Buckley's use
of differing terminology, then, is at least partly a result of the Court's transition
from earlier tests regarding speech regulations, such as the "clear and present
danger" test,' to the more formalized tiers of review popular today. The Court's
current use of either strict or intermediate scrutiny, however, is firmly grounded,
and Shrink's refusal to confront and clarify its standard of review in light of the
prevailing approach is inexcusable. Moreover, Buckley used much the same
terminology in discussing expenditure limits as it did in discussing contribution
limits." Shrink's intimation that Buckley's terminology indicates a lower-thanstrict scrutiny standard never adequately deals with that fact nor explains away
the evolution of the standard towards strict scrutiny in the expenditure context.86

81. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981) ("Contributions by individuals... [are] beyond
question a very significant form of political expression ... [and] regulation of First
Amendment rights is always subject to exacting judicial scrutiny."); see also LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTIONALLAW § 13-28, at 1139-40 (2d ed. 1988) (noting
that Citizens Against Rent Control appeared to apply a standard akin to strict scrutiny).
82. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986); Cal.
Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 195-98 (1981); see also TRIBE, supra note 81, § 1328, at 1138-39 (characterizing California Medical Ass'n as applying a standard of
scrutiny lower than strict scrutiny).
83. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciplein the FirstAmendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20
(1975) (generally noting the use of an equal protection framework in First Amendment
cases).
84. The Court originally assessed speech regulations using this test. See, e.g.,
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion); Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,308 (1940). Since Mosely, however, the Court
uses the clear and present danger test only in limited circumstances, such as incitement
of illegal activity, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), or criticism of the
judicial process, see Bridges, 314 U.S. at 252.
85. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1976) (noting that the
"independent expenditure ceiling... fails to serve any substantial government interest
in stemming corruption or the appearance of corruption"); Id. at 14-15 (noting that both
contribution and expenditure limitations operated "in an area of fundamental First
Amendment activities... [where] the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most
urgent application").
86. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263-65 (1986)
(requiring a "compelling" state interest to justify expenditure limitations and that the
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Beyond simply being inexcusable, Shrink can be interpreted as a deliberate
attempt to obfuscate.
B. The Evidence
Shrink's second significant flaw comes in its application of the standard of
review to the evidence. According to the Court, Senator Goode's affidavit, the
newspapers relied upon by the lower court, and Proposition A all provided ample
evidence supporting the state's assertion that Missouri citizens' perceived
problems of corruption stemming from large campaign contributions." A close
review of that evidence, however, reveals several problems.
Turning first to Senator Goode's affidavit, the relevant portions read:
6. The campaign contribution limits proposed in SB 650...
were the work product of the Interim Joint Committee [on Campaign
Finance Reform]. A broad spectrum of opinions were heard on the
issue of campaign contribution limits. The members of the Committee
discussed among ourselves at length not only what it cost to run a
campaign and deliver a message to the populace, but also at what point
is there the potential for contributions to become unduly influential.
8. The Committee heard testimony on and discussed the
significant issue of balancing the need for campaign contributions
versus the potential for buying influence....
9. I believed in 1993 and I believe today that the contributions
over those limits have the appearance of buying votes as well as the
real potential to buy votes. The greater the contribution, the greater
potential there is for the appearance of and the actual buying of votes.
11. I believe that the experience in the last three elections has
also shown that the appearance of corruption because of campaign
contributions has decreased in state elections. Imposing limits
prevents the disproportionate funding of a particular campaign and,
therefore, prevents the potential for buying influence

regulation "curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular problem at
hand").
87. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,393-95 (2000).
88. See Petitioners' Brief at 46a-47a, Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377 (2000) (No. 98-963) (J.A., Aff. of Sen. Wayne Goode).
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Notably missing from the affidavit are descriptions of the number and status89 of
persons testifying before the committee as well as concrete examples of the
public's concern regarding large contributions. In reality, the affidavit is little
more than a conclusory statement regarding the Senator's belief as to the
problem." A comprehensive legislative history with recorded testimony and
committee reports might have alleviated this problem as they would have
allowed the Court to check the validity of the affidavit. As the Shrink majority
acknowledged, however, Missouri does not maintain formal legislative history.'
Thus, the affidavit provides little solid foundation for concluding that the public
perceives large contributions as amounting to influence peddling.
The Shrink Court's reliance on a handful of newspaper articles and
Proposition A was similarly flawed. While many of the articles cited in the
decision advocated limits on campaign financing, the Court's assumption that
these articles represented the public's general fear of corruption is unwarranted.
Several of the cited articles were editorial pieces,' which newspapers take great
pains to separate from their general reporting precisely because they represent
only the writers' point of view. Furthermore, at least one of the articles relied
upon took no position on contribution limitations at all, instead noting only that
both candidates for state auditor received large contributions from local
businesses.93 The other simply cited then-Governor Mel Camahan's opinion that
"[w]e need a system that will make sure that our democratic institutions care as
much about John Doe and Jane Doe as they do about any big company or
wealthy individual." 94 Merely because a few citizens, politicians, or newspaper
reporters expressed their views favoring campaign finance limitations does not
provide evidence of a similar state-wide trend.
Proposition A, the now-defunct state-wide referendum that overwhelmingly
approved campaign contributions limitations, 95 did provide a foundation for

89. The affidavit does not indicate, for example, whether its conclusions are drawn
from statements of the public at large or simply from other legislators.
90. See, e.g., Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 522 (1999), rev'd
sub nom. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (noting the "self-serving
and conclusory" nature of the Senator's statements given his "vested interest in having
the courts sustain the law that emerged from his committee").
91. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 393.
92. See, e.g., Editorial, FourProposalson the MissouriBallot, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1994, at 6B; Editorial, The CentralIssue is Trust, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Dec. 31, 1993, at 6C; Kathy Richardson, Letter to the Editor, ST. LouIs POSTDISPATCH, Nov. 5, 1994, at 15B; Robyn Steely, Money andState Senators, ST. Louis
POsT-DISPATCH, Aug. 21, 1994, at 3B.
93. See Jo Mannies, Auditor Race May Get Too Noisy To Be Ignored, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 11, 1994, at 4B.

94. John A. Dvorak, Election Reform Backed Lid on Contributionsto Campaign's
Wins Carnahan's Support, K.C. STAR, Nov. 14, 1993, at BI.
95. Approximately seventy-four percent of Missouri voters approved of
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assuming that citizens generally favor such limitations. The mere fact that the
referendum passed, however, does not explain why it passed, and that lack of
explanation is significant. Buckley and its progeny made clear that combating
corruption or the appearance of corruption was the only compelling interest of
those proffered in favor of campaign finance limitations. Otherjustifications,
such as the desire to equalize citizens' ability to influence the outcome of
elections or to make the political system more open to candidates, are
insufficient. It is unclear, however, whether citizens of Missouri supported
Proposition A because they feared potential corruption or because they simply
wished for the ability to compete on the same playing field with wealthy citizens
and corporations. In fact, many of the newspaper articles cited to prove citizens'
perception of corruption contain statements reflecting the operation of an invalid
justification as well. Thus, one newspaper reported that "Proposition A
supporters said the limit would temper the influence of special interests andput
political newcomers on a more level playingfield at election time." 7 Other
reports discuss the need to eradicate "big money" from campaigns, but are
unclear as to whether supporters of Proposition A fear corruption or simply
desire a more equal playing field."

Proposition A. See Jo Mannies, Nixon Backs Lower Lid on CampaignDonations,ST.
LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 1994, at IA. For a discussion of Proposition A's fate
in the legal system, see supranote 43.
96. Buckley did not consider the latter interests in upholding contribution
limitations, finding it "unnecessary to look beyond" the appearance of corruption
rationale. Bucldey v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976). In reviewing expenditure
limitations, however, the Court noted that the equalization and competition rationales
were invalid interests altogether. i at 48-49. In later cases, the Court emphasized that
"preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption [were] the only legitimate and
compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting" campaign
contributions as well as expenditures. FEC v. Nat'1 Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. at 49697; Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S.
290, 296-97 (1981).

97. Kevin Q. Murphy, Low-Key Proposition A Would Refashion Election
Financing,K.C. STAR, Oct. 28, 1994, at Al (emphasis added); see also id. (quoting one
source as approving Proposition A because "many people can afford to give S300 but not
$1,000, which would put their contributions on a par with corporations and other
traditional big players").
98. One proponent of Proposition A apparently saw "big money" as the source of
increasingly negative and expensive campaigning. While one could interpret her
underlying ratiotale as relating to corruption, she never mentions corruption or the
appearance of corruption in her letter. See Richardson, supranote 92, at 15B. Another
proponent described "the overwhelming role that business plays in our political process"
because "[a]lmost 70 percent of the state Senate campaign funds were from the business
sector." Steely, supranote 92, at 3B. Again, while one could logically presume that the
writer fears corruption of politicians, one could just as easily assume that she desires to
have her voice heard on an equal basis.
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None of this is to say that Missouri was wrong in thinking that its citizens
feared potential corruption from large campaign contributions. However, the
state did not prove that fact. The Court's willingness to rely on a self-serving
affidavit and ambiguous newspaper articles to support the appearance of
corruption rationale amounts to little more than an acceptance of the "mere
conjecture" it claimed was inadequate to satisfy First Amendment review." This
is not the kind of review that we typically associate with strict scrutiny. Nor
does it reflect the Court's application of intermediate scrutiny, which has become
increasingly more stringent in recent years." ° The Shrink Court's approach is
simply not scrutiny. It is unquestioning deference to the legislature. Such
deference has no place in a framework that purports to apply something other
than minimal review, as do Shrink and the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence generally.'
One could again attribute Shrink's evidentiary shortfalls to Buckley. In
upholding the contribution limitations, Buckley barely mentioned, much less
discussed, Congress's evidence supporting the corruption/appearance of
corruption rationale." Perhaps, then, Shrink merely followed Buckley's lead.
Upon further review, however, Shrink goes well beyond Buckley's apparent
disinterest in evidentiary support.
Although the Buckley Court did not discuss the evidence at length, it
specifically referred to the lower court's evidentiary findings as supporting the
notion that "the problem [of corruption or the perception thereof was] not an
illusory one."" Those findings included cites to legislative history"° detailing
specific campaign abuses, including milk industry donations of more than two
million dollars to President Nixon in exchange for an alleged price support
increase,' s lavish (and sometimes illegal) contributions by special interests to
99. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000).
100. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (citations
omitted) (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985))

(The state must "do more than simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought to be
cured.' It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and

that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.").
101. While the Court has applied minimal or rational basis scrutiny in equal
protection analysis, it applies that analysis in First Amendment jurisprudence only in the
case of incidental burdens on speech. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in
ConstitutionalAnalysis,85 CAL. L. REv. 297, 305 (1997).
102. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976). Even Shrink PAC's and
Fredman's lawyers characterized Buckley's evidentiary foundation as thin at best. See

D. Bruce LaPierre, Raising A New First Amendment Hurdlefor Campaign Finance
"Reform ", 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217, 225 (1998); see also Tao, supranote 13, at 1374.
103. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 & n.28.
104. The appellate court relied heavily on the Congress's investigations, hearings,
and report regarding campaign abuses. See FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVrTIES, S. REP. No. 93-981, at 587-621 (1974).
105. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd in part,
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various Senators that were designed to "obtain governmental favor,"tC and
President Nixon's practice of requiring large contributions before considering
candidates for particular ambassadorships." ° The substance and timing of these
allegations, coupled with President Nixon's apparent use of campaign donations
to finance the Watergate break-in,' explain much of the Supreme Court's
willingness to accept the government's appearance of corruption rationale for
regulating contributions.
The Shrink Court's deference, however, cannot be so explained. Shrink's
record referred to no legislative history documenting campaign finance abuses.
Nor did the affidavit, newspaper articles, or passing of Proposition A provide
concrete evidence of citizens' perception of such abuses. Moreover, unlike the
era in which Buckley was decided, there appears to have been no extraordinary
circumstances explaining the Court's willingness to assume a public perception
of corruption." Thus, while Buckley arguably did not require much evidence
of perceived corruption, at least the Court relied upon something. Shrinkupheld
Missouri's contribution limitations based upon no evidence at all.
HL1. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SHRINK'S FLAWS
Given their obvious parallels, it would be foolish to argue that Buckley did
not influence the Shrink decision. Nevertheless, as evidenced in the above
discussion, something more is going on. This Section discusses what that
"something more" is. Specifically, it argues that Shrink results as much from the
Court's current multi-tiered system of judicial review as it does from Buckley.
In order to understand the relationship between Shrink and the Court's broader
jurisprudence, this Section first recounts a brief history of the Court's standards
of scrutiny and their flaws, and then discusses the manner in which Shrink
reflects those flaws.

424 U.S. 1 (1976). The milk industry specifically crafted these donations to avoid
disclosure requirements, a maneuver that further supports the corruption/appearance of

corruption rationale.
106. Id. at 839 n.37.
107. Id. at 840 n.38.
108. See Marshall, supranote 15, at 339.
109. A few of the newspaper articles cited as evidence referred to a scandal
involving former Missouri Attorney General William Webster, who steered state business
to certain lawyers later indicted for overcharging the state. See Mannies, supra note 93,
at 4B; Murphy, supranote 97, at Al. Webster himself was imprisoned for using state
resources to finance his campaign for governor. See Murphy, supra note 97, at Al.
While these incidents evidence corruption arguably linked to campaign contributions,
they are pale shadows of the occurrences giving rise to Buckley. Moreover, the nature
of the evidence-a passing mention of the Webster scandal in a newspaper article--is not
comparable to the legislative history available to the Buckley Court.
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A. The History ofMulti-Level Review
The Court's multi-tiered system of judicial review is a substantial feature
of its constitutional jurisprudence."' That system consists of three levels of
scrutiny-strict, intermediate, and rational basis-all of which share the same
general structure. Each judges a law affecting the exercise of a constitutional
right by (1) examining the importance of the government's interest, and (2)
asking whether the law is sufficiently tailored to meet that interest. Thus, the
government's interest must be compelling, substantial, or legitimate and the law
must be necessary, narrowly drawn, or reasonably related to that interest
depending upon whether the Court uses, respectively, strict, intermediate, or
rational basis scrutiny."' The Court determines which standard of scrutiny to
use depending upon the burden placed upon a constitutional right. Strict scrutiny
is reserved for laws seriously burdening constitutional rights, such as laws
discriminating against the expression of particular viewpoints in the First
Amendment context, or laws discriminating based upon race in the Fourteenth
Amendment context."' The Court applies intermediate scrutiny to laws that
somewhat burden the exercise of individual rights, such as content-neutral laws
directly affecting expression or laws that discriminate on the basis of gender.'
Finally, a law that only minimally burdens constitutional rights (the vast bulk of
all laws) is subject only to rational basis scrutiny." 4
The multi-tiered system of review is largely a product of the Warren and
Burger Courts and arose as an effort to obtain objectivity in the Court's
jurisprudence after critics in the first half of the twentieth century accused the
Court of using ad hoc, activist, and policy-oriented balancing tests"lS to

110. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of
the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 161 (1984) (noting that "[c]ontemporary

constitutional adjudication is characterized by an elaborate system of judicial review
composed of multiple levels of scrutiny").
111. See Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference,JudicialReviev, and
the Bill ofRights, 84 IOWA L. Rnv. 941,955 (1999); Bhagwat, supra note 101, at 303-04.
112. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)

(striking down under strict scrutiny race-based classifications); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (noting that viewpoint-based restrictions are subject to strict
scrutiny).
113. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
(intermediate scrutiny applied to content-neutral law requiring performers in city park to
use certain sound amplification equipment); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 724 (1982) (intermediate scrutiny applied to gender-based exclusion from nursing
school).

114. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
115. I use the term "balancing" in the same manner as Alexander Aleinikoff who
defines it as the process of"analyz[ing] a constitutional question by identifying interests
implicated by [a] case and reach[ing] a decision or construct[ing] a rule of constitutional
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determine the constitutionality of many laws."" Reluctant to give up the
flexibility and pragmatism of balancing tests entirely, the Court sought to
"extemaliz[e] the balancing process," extending it beyond judges' subjective
preferences to focus on objectively "out there" societal interests that might, in
some instances, justify infringement of constitutional rights." 7 The Court also
sought to formalize balancing, by applying it in the manner of a mathematical
formula."' The Court's tiers of scrutiny, with their mandate that judges examine
the nature of government interests at stake and the care with which a law is
tailored, appear to accomplish these tasks." 9
The Court's attempt to create a more detached system of constitutional
review was not entirely successful. As many critics have noted, the Court's
standards, as written, are abstract'"
They require judges to balance
"compelling," "substantial," or "legitimate" interests, but they provide no

law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the identified interests." T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age ofBalancing,96 YALE LJ. 943, 945 (1987).
116. See id at 948-63 (discussing the Court's history of balancing and academic
calls for change); see also Bhagwat, supranote 101, at 306-07 (discussing origin of tiers

of scrutiny in Warren and Burger Courts' jurisprudence); Shaman, supra note 110, at
161-62 (attributing current tiers of scrutiny to Roosevelt's Court-packing plan and the
resulting lack of legitimacy of the Court's actions).
117. Aleinikoff, supra note 115, at 962-63.
118. See Aleinikoff, supranote 115, at 963.

119. The Court's standards of scrutiny do not explicitly incorporate a balancing
analysis. Nevertheless, many scholars conceive of them as requiring Alinikoff's
balancing of interests. As Kathleen Sullivan notes, the typical configuration of
constitutional litigation includes:
[A] right or structural provision, a claimed government infringement of the

right or the structural provision, and a claimed government interest or
justification for the infringement. Balancing takes into account background
principles or policies affecting each of these components-how important is
the right, how bad was the infringement, and how good is the government's

reason.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices ofRules
andStandards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 60 (1992). This description encompasses much
of what the Court's tiers of scrutiny, as written, are designed to do.
For scholars describing tiers of scrutiny as involving balancing, see Alinikoff,
supra note 115, at 946; Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)evolution of
ConstitutionalDoctrine,30 CONN. L. REV. 961,963-64 (1998); Solove, supra note 111,
at 954-55. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary
Reasons in ConstitutionalLaw, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 711-12 (1994) (noting that

'Judicial rhetoric" of tiers of scrutiny appears to use balancing although "balancing does
not describe the actual process operating in large areas of constitutional decision

making").
120. See Aleinikoff, supra note 115, at 992-93; Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic
Constitution,84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 199-200 (1985); Shaman, supranote 110, at 174.
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mechanism for determining which interests fall into which category.12 1
Similarly, there is no internal mechanism for determining when a law meets the
requirement that it be "necessary," "narrowly drawn," or "rationally related" to
the state's interest." Thus, while these standards of review purport to give
mathematical precision, they actually give little guidance to judges in resolving
disputes. As a consequence, the objectivity manifested in the Court's multi-level
review may simply mask, rather than eradicate, ad hoc judicial decisionmaking.12

To some extent, the Court has managed to work around the abstractness of
its standards. +Ithas primarily done so by making the application of a particular
standard so rigid as to reach the same result in almost every case. Thus, while
strict scrutiny ostensibly allows a court to uphold a law if it is necessary to meet
a compelling state interest, that standard almost always results in the law's
demise. " Hence, the saying that strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in
fact.' 't 2 Similarly, the Court almost never strikes down a law using rational
basis review, which has become equated with total judicial deference." 6 In
effect, the categorization of a law as subject to either strict or minimal scrutiny
is outcome determinative, with the actual application of those standards a
rhetorical and mechanical afterthought. 27 This approach relieves judges of the
need to guess regarding the application of standards of scrutiny, except in the
case of intermediate scrutiny, which remains a true balancing test., 8

121. See Bhagwat, supranote 101, at 308; Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know What,
When, andHow: The Systemic Incoherence of "Interest" Scrutiny, in PUBLIC VALUES
INCONSTTUTIONAL LAW 219, 220-22 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993).
122. See Bhagwat,supranote 101, at 322 (noting that "means scrutiny" component
of the Court's standards of scrutiny is "notoriously manipulable").
123. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 120, at 202 (The formulaic "style reflects
intellectual embarrassment about the existence of judicial discretion but is designed to
assure plentiful opportunities for its exercise.").
124. See Bhagwat, supranote 101, at 304; Sullivan, supra note 119, at 60.
125. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrineon a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86

HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
126. See Shaman, supranote 110, at 161-62; Sullivan, supranote 119, at 60.
127. See Sullivan, supra note 119, at 60 (noting that although tiers of scrutiny
"employ nominal balancing rhetoric" the Court has "tie[d] itself to the twin masts of strict
scrutiny and rationality review in order to resist (or appear to resist) the siren song of the
sliding scale").
128. See Shaman, supra note 110, at 162-63 (noting that intermediate scrutiny
developed as a method to soften the rigidity of strict and rational basis scrutiny);
Sullivan, supra note 119, at 61 (categorizing intermediate scrutiny as a balancing test
located somewhere between strict and rational basis scrutiny); see also Ashutosh
Bhagwat, OfMarketsandMedia: The FirstAmendment, the New Mass Media, and the
PoliticalComponents of Culture,74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 166-70 (1995) (discussing ad hoc
balancing involved in the intermediate scrutiny standard used for judging content-neutral
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Even this interpretation, however, presents substantial problems. First, the
Court occasionally finds itself boxed in by its rigidly defined levels of review,
causing it to engage in subterfuge. By this, I mean that the Court sometimes
faces a case that logically should be assessed under one level of scrutiny. For
whatever reason, however, the Court dislikes the result of that application but
cannot justify using a lower level of scrutiny. As a consequence, it manipulates
another aspect of the case to reach the desired result In City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres,Inc.,"'S for example, the Court faced the constitutionality of
a law regulating the location of adult theaters. The law was facially contentbased and under typical circumstances would have been struck down under strict
scrutiny. The Court's ambivalence toward sexually explicit speech, however,
led it to uphold the statute. 30 It did so by sleight-of-hand, claiming that the law
was actually content-neutral and subject to more lenient, intermediate scrutiny.'
By subverting the content-based/content-neutral distinction, the Court thus
managed to work around its rigidly defined tiers of scrutiny.'
At other times, the Court, faced with having to choose which standard to
apply, has simply declined to do so. In Rostker v. Goldberg,' for example, the
Court faced a due process challenge to a male-only draft law. That challenge
required the Court to determine whether it should apply intermediate scrutiny to
review a law discriminating against women or rational basis scrutiny to review
a law governing military matters."3 Although the Court cited much precedent,
a close reading of the case reveals that it never actually chose a standard of
review and instead upheld the law simply because it was 'vell within
3S In fact, the Court explicitly noted that
[Congress's] constitutional authority.""I
standards of review were unhelpful as they "may all too readily become facile

regulations of speech).
129. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
130. The Court's ambivalence toward sexually explicit speech was best
summarized by Justice Stevens: "[Flew of us would march our sons and daughters off
to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in
theaters of our choice." Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,70 (1976).

131. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-50.
132. For a more detailed discussion of Renton, see Christina E. Wells, (f
Communists and Anti-Abortion Protestors: The Consequences of Falling Into the
TheoreticalAbyss, 33 GA. L. REV. 1, 55-58 (1998). The Court arguably engaged in a
similar subterfuge in TurnerBroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC,512 U.S. 622 (1994),
where, over the vociferous dissent of four Justices, it upheld an arguably content-based
statute by deeming it to be content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny. For a
more in-depth discussion of Turner,see Bhagwat, supra note 128, at 155-67; C. Edwin

Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-BasedRegulationsof PersonsandPresses,1994
Sup. CT. REv. 57, 58-61.
133. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).

134. Id. at 64-69.
135. Id. at 83.
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abstractions used to justify a result."' 3 6 While the Court may have been right
regarding the abstract nature of its standards, its refusal to choose one allowed
it to dodge difficult issues and left it with enormous flexibility in interpreting the
case as precedent in subsequent proceedings. Ultimately, although the Court's
rigidly defined levels of review aim for objectivity, cases such as Renton and
Goldbergreveal that potentially subjective and ad hoc judgments can still occur.
A second problem with the Court's multi-tiered review comes in the
application of intermediate scrutiny. Although the Court treats strict and rational
basis scrutiny rigidly, intermediate scrutiny is still a balancing test. In the
context of the Court's tiers of scrutiny, balancing relies upon empirical and
factual assessments, including "a valuation of the end that the law aims to
achieve" as well as "the viability of means [to achieve the law], the effectiveness
of means, and the existence and effectiveness of alternative means." '37 The
Court's standards, however, impede its ability to balance in this manner.
First, the Court has not developed a jurisprudence regarding the nature of
governmental interests in any context Because of its rigid treatment of strict and
rationality review, there was often no need to value the government's
interest-the presumption of constitutionality or unconstitutionality associated
with each standard was actually the determining factor.'
The practice of
ignoring the government's interest spilled over into intermediate scrutiny as well.
Thus, regardless of the test applied, the Court generally eschews an examination
of governmental interests altogether, often accepting them at face value.'
Second, the tailoring requirement, although ostensibly the critical factor in the
Court's standards of review," is equally empty. As with the Court's
examination of governmental interests, the outcome-determinative aspect of
strict and rational basis scrutiny allows the Court to avoid any significant review
of tailoring in those contexts. 4 ' This approach leaves intermediate scrutiny as
the sole area in which the Court must make real determinations regarding the

136. Id. at 69-70. For a more in-depth discussion of cases in which the Court
refused to choose a standard of review, see Shaman, supra note 110, at 165-66.
137. Solove, supranote 111, at 955.
138. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-LiberalJudging: The Roles of Categorization
andBalancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296 (1992) (noting in the context of rationality
review, that "the government is supposed to win-and any lawyer who hires expert
witnesses to dispute the empirical basis for legislation .. .is wasting the client's
money").

139. See Bhagwat, supra note 101, at 307-08; Solove, supra note 111, at 960-66.
140. See Bhagwat, supranote 101, at 308; Solove, supra note 111, at 955.
141. This is not to say that the Court refuses to engage in such an analysis. Indeed,
examination of a law's tailoring often comprises the bulk of opinions applying strict and
rationality review. However, that application is often rhetorical in nature. See Bhagwat,
supranote 101, at 304 ("[T]he categorization process has in most cases been outcomedeterminative.... [E]ven scrutiny of the fit between means and ends has tended to be a
mere formality.").
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law's viability, effectiveness, and whether other, narrower laws could serve the
same purpose. Without a presumption regarding constitutionality or any
guideposts against which to gauge the meaning of "substantial" or "narrowly
tailored," the Court's application of that standard is remarkably inconsistent, at
best, or remarkably deferential, at worst.
As initially applied in the free speech context for example, intermediate
scrutiny was more rigorous than rationality review. In CentralHudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. PublicService Commission ofNew York, 42 the Court struck
down a regulation of commercial speech after announcing that it would use
intermediate scrutiny to review such regulations." Similarly, the Court's cases
applying early versions of intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral regulations
of speech also resulted in findings of unconstitutionality.'" In both situations,
the Court undertook substantial examination of the law's tailoring to determine
whether there was factual support for it. Subsequent cases, however, took a
different approach to intermediate scrutiny. Apparently uncomfortable with the
abstract nature of the test and its ability to evaluate the government's evidentiary
support, the Court began to apply intermediate scrutiny far more leniently."4
Eventually, the Court's application of intermediate scrutiny, especially its review
of the government's evidence in support of the law, became so deferential ' that

142. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
143. Although the four-pronged test in CentralHudson appears somewhat different
from the traditional iteration of intermediate scrutiny, the Court has intimated that
CentralHudson'stest amounts to intermediate scrutiny. See Bd. of Trustees of S.UN.Y.
v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,477 (1989).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
145. For commercial speech cases applying a deferential form of intermediate
scrutiny, see Fox,492 U.S. at 469; Posadasde PuertoRico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478
U.S. 328 (1986); Metromedia,Inc. v. City ofSan Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). For cases
applying a deferential form of intermediate review to content-neutral regulations of
speech, see Ward v. RockAgainst Racism, 491 U.S. 781,799 (1989); Clarkv. Cmty.for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Members of the City Councilof LA. v.
Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
146. Posadas,which upheld a law banning casino advertising directed at residents
of Puerto Rico, represents the culmination of the Court's deferential review in the
commercial speech context. As one commentator noted, the Court's review upheld the
law "without evidence of record on the basis of mere representations of the State.' Philip
B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'wos Strange, 'Twas
PassingStrange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twos Wondrous Pitiful", 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 7-12;
see also Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech
ImplicationsofRust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1724, 1746 (1995). In Ward, the Court took a similarly deferential approach in
reviewing a content-neutral regulation of speech, weakening the tailoring prong of
intermediate scrutiny so as to require that a law be only "reasonable." Ward, 491 U.S.
at 799.
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it amounted to little more than rationality review. 4 7 Recently, the Court has
intimated that its intermediate scrutiny standard has more teeth than previously
thought. 48 While a promising move away from deference, the Court's lack of
consistency in this area reinforces the argument that intermediate scrutiny is
utterly untethered and capable of substantial manipulation.
B. Multi-Level Review and Shrink
This understanding of the Court's multi-level review sheds light on Shrink's
flaws. First, the rigidity of the Court's multi-level review played a significant
role in Shrink. Buckley's rhetoric suggests that the Court intended to apply a
standard akin to strict scrutiny. The Missouri law limiting campaign
contributions should fail under our current understanding of that scrutiny. To
strike down the law, though, appears to be inconsistent with Buckley, which
admittedly applied a more balancing-like version of the strict scrutiny test.
Application of Buckley in light of the Court's usual treatment of strict scrutiny
thus presented the Shrink Court with a dilemma-should it openly acknowledge
that Buckley meant to apply a lower standard of scrutiny than its rhetoric
indicated, or should it acknowledge strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard but
find a way to justify upholding the law?
Both options posed substantial questions regarding the Court's consistency.
Most courts applying Buckley have assumed that it announced a strict scrutiny
standard. 49 The Shrink Court's decision to change that standard would have
affected numerous lower court decisions and, moreover, would have required an
explanation regarding the Court's apparent change of heart. The second option,
upholding contribution limitations after applying strict scrutiny, flies in the face
of the Court's generally rigid approach. 5 ' Applying that test as an actual
147. For scholarly discussions of the Court's increasingly deferential application
of intermediate scrutiny, see Bhagwat, supranote 128, at 169-70 (intermediate scrutiny
applied to content-neutral regulations); Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand
the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 654 (1991) (same); Albert P. Mauro, Jr.,
Comment, Commercial Speech After Posadas and Fox: A Rational Basis Wolf in
Intermediate Sheep's Clothing, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1931-32 (1992) (intermediate
scrutiny applied to commercial speech); David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical
Analysis of CommercialSpeech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 369-81 (1990) (same).
148. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996)
(subjecting a regulation banning commercial speech to a rigorous form of intermediate

scrutiny imposing a "heavy burden" on the State to justify the law); Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 624 (1994) (requiring under intermediate scrutiny that the
government "demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that
the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way"); see also
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
149. See supranote 67.
150. See supranotes 124-25 and accompanying text. Professor Bhagwat argues
that the Court increasingly uses strict scrutiny as a true balancing test. Bhagwat, supra
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balancing test could easily lead to accusations of bias and politicking!" At the
very least, it requires an explanation as to whether and why the strict scrutiny
standard should move toward a true balancing test, a task made especially
difficult in light of the Court's recent reiteration that strict scrutiny poses a heavy
burden on government to justify infringement of constitutional rights."s The
analogical crisis"n facing the Shrink Court ultimately caused it to blink. Rather
than directly addressing these problems, the Court instead purported to apply
Buckley while never quite actually telling us what Buckley required. Such a
move is reminiscent of the Renton and Goldberg Court's manipulation and
suggests just the sort of"ad hoc"
review so heavily criticized in association with
54
the Court's tiers of scrutiny.'
Second, Shrink's review of the state's evidence reflects the phenomenon of
deference associated with an untethered balancing test like intermediate scrutiny.
Shrink's seeming deviation from the Court's traditional tiers of scrutiny left it
with no basis for assessing the government's purported interests, or the Missouri

note 119, at 964-66. While there is truth to this statement, this phenomenon is still
relatively rare and viewed as anomalous. See Christina E. Wells, BringingStructureto
the Law ofInjunctions Against Expression,51 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 43 n.192 (2000).
151. See Wells, supranote 150, at 48.
152. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., No. 98-1682, slip op. at 8-14
(Nov. 30, 1999).
153. See Sullivan, supranote 138, at 297 (noting that the Court's deviation from
strict or rationality review often comes about because of a crisis in analogical reasoning).
154. The Court had a possible "out" in this regard. Although it has applied strict
scrutiny to laws interfering with the First Amendment right to freely associate, in the past
it typically upheld them. See, e.g., Bd. of Dir. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte,
481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Thus,
freedom of association cases represent an area in which strict scrutiny has a meaning
different from its typical application in the First Amendment context. See David E.
Bernstein,AntidiscriminationLavs andthe FirstAmendment, 66 1o. L. REV. 83,94-100
(2001). Because the Buckley Court emphasized the association aspects of contribution
limitations when upholding them, Shrink could simply have noted that strict scrutiny vas
appropriate and that this, like other association cases, was a case in which strict scrutiny
was met. Shrink's refusal to do this is somewhat mystifying. Perhaps it feared that
creating an explicit exception to its typically rigid approach would open it up to
accusations ofbias and politicking. See supranote 150-51 and accompanying text. That
approach, however, had some basis in the Court's existing practice and would have
alleviated the need to obfuscate its standards.
It is also possible that the Shrink majority felt that its hands were tied by the Court's
most recent association case, Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000), in
which the Court struck down a public accommodations law while reaffirming that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review. Id. at 2449, 2456-57. Dale suggests
that the Court's application of strict scrutiny to laws interfering with the right to
expressive association may be moving back to a more common understanding of strict
scrutiny. If so, Shrink's refusal to clarify the standard of review looks even more
political.
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law's tailoring. Apparently believing itself to be incapable of reviewing the
legitimacy of the government's corruption rationale, the Court accepted, without
question, the government's proffered interest and the minimal evidence
supporting it, even though that evidence contained indications of potentially
illegitimate purposes. Shrink's review of the contribution law's tailoring is
similarly deferential, with little attempt by the majority to examine empirical
findings regarding the contribution limitation's effect and whether there were
less restrictive alternatives.'55 Instead, Shrink found the law to be "good enough"
because "surgical precision" was not required. To be sure, that rhetoric stems
from Buckley. But Shrink's abdication of its obligation to review the evidence
goes much further than the Court's earlier decision in Buckley and reflects a
more fundamental phenomenon within the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Why does all of this matter? After Shrink, it is apparent that contribution
limitations will survive judicial scrutiny. Whether that is so because Shrink
applied Buckley or because of some other phenomenon is arguably immaterial;
the result remains the same. Nevertheless, the manner in which Shrink reached
its result does matter, both to the campaign finance debate and generally to First
Amendment jurisprudence.
The Shrink Court's utter abdication of judicial review, for example,
signifies that future attempts to regulate contribution limits-no matter how
restrictive or how improper their actual motivation-will easily survive
constitutional scrutiny. The Court's actions thus suggest that the rules of the
contribution limitations game have changed. Although their purpose ostensibly
must be prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof, the absence of
meaningful judicial review after Shrink may result in pretextual use of such
interests by the legislature. Indeed, legislators' self-interest in preserving their
power suggests that such use is highly likely.'56 Understanding the manner in

155. In fact, one could characterize the Court's assessment of empirical data as
highly selective. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 426 & n.10 (2000)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's brief discussion of empirical data failed
to assess the percentage of funds raised by contributions in excess of the limits and
overlooked the quantitative data indicating that spending decreased by half after
imposition of the contribution limits). According to the dissent, the overlooked data
supported the notion that the law was overly restrictive. Id.
156. See Marshall, supra note 15, at 339-40 (noting the problem of "legislative
entrenchment" that impedes campaign finance reform). Although scholars have noted
this concern with respect to Buckley, see, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, CampaignFinance
Reform: Specious Arguments, IntractableDilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1258, 1278-79
(1994); Marshall, supra note 15, at 339-40; Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The
Right of ExpressiveAccess in FirstAmendment Theory: Redistributive Values andthe
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which Shrink effected its deferential review may allow scholars and litigators to
educate the Court and prevent such occurrences. Rather than simply rely on
normative and abstract arguments regarding the need to move away from
Buckley-none of which seem to have impressed a majority of the Court-they
can also use methodological critiques, explaining the manner in which the
Court's approach to judicial review causes problems. Eventually, the Court may
re-examine its application of Shrink's standards and strengthen them over time,
as it has done in other areas, such as its application of intermediate scrutiny.'n
Moreover, the Shrink Court's deference may have substantial implications
for the place that "purpose scrutiny" has in the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. Much of that jurisprudence aims at guarding against
"illegitimate" purposes.'58 Indeed, the entire structure of its jurisprudence
appears to be geared toward guarding against such purposes.'5" Even the
Buckley Court acknowledged that some reasons simply were insufficient to
justify speech regulation." The Shrink Court's deference, however, indicates
a striking lack of concern for the government's possible use of pretextual
reasons. That, coupled with the Court's manipulation of its existing tiers of
scrutiny, may signal an erosion of the Court's willingness to use government
purposes as a cornerstone of its jurisprudence. It is not enough to say that in this
particular area the public's fear of corruption is so obvious that it can be
assumed. In past cases, the assumption of an "obvious" motive allowed the
Court to uphold regulations that we now agree were grounded in illicit
motivation.' The Court must maintain not only its strict sense of legitimate
versus illegitimate motives, it must also maintain a method by which such
motives are discerned.
Finally, and ever more globally, understanding the source of Shrink's flaws
is necessary to expose the Court's perfidy and urge it toward a more useful
jurisprudence. The Court's increasing tendency to hide behind abstractions and
rhetorical decisions6 calls into question its legitimacy as an institution. To be

DemocraticDilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1083 (1999); Martin Shapiro, Corruption,
Freedom andEquality in CampaignFinancing,18 HOFSTRAL. REV. 385,390-91 (1989),
Shrink's removal of the threat ofjudicial review altogether can only encourage legislators
to extreme actions.
157. See supranote 148.
158. See Bhagwat, supra note 101, at 302.
159. See Christina E. Wells, ReinvigoratingAutonomy: Freedom & Responsibility
in the Supreme Court'sFirstAmendment Jurisprudence,32 HARV. CR-CL L. REV. 159
(1997).

160. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,48-49 (1976).
161. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966) (upholding criminal
convictions of communist party members).
162. See Wells, supra note 132', at 5-6 (noting that "the Court's decisions have
evolved haphazardly and are empty and easily manipulable" that the Court tends to
"supportFI its decisions by simply citing to past precedent with little or no explanation,"
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sure, many of the decisions with which the Court is faced are hard. But
application of abstract and manipulable standards, although easing the writing
of a difficult opinion, do not justify it. As Professor Fallon has noted:
[W]e trust the Supreme Court to... at least be disciplined by the
demands of principle and by the requirement of articulate reason
giving.... For the most part, it may be fair for the Court simply to
presume that prior decisions have established doctrine that reasonably
implements constitutional principles. But when the Court's majority
declines a dissenting opinion's express challenge to justify its decision
at a deeper level, it refuses to accept the full discipline of articulate
justification that helps to support the legitimacy ofjudicial review."
Cases like Shrink, in which the Court pretends to apply law while essentially
abdicating its role, support notions that the Court is merely a political institution,
even if in most cases such an accusation is untrue.

and that its citation ofprecedent is "often selective").
163. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term-Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 117 (1997).
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